Yesterday i surfed despite the choppy and messy waves, i managed to catch a few but nothing spectacular, later in the evening i fell asleep into a long needed deep dream filled nocturnal journey, i awake well rested.
I've recently finished two books on ayahuascia, one was a sort of new age womans journy with the medicine, and i have to say was totally self aborbing, more like trappsing through someones diary, the other by melzer was fantastic, offerring many points of veiw it was informative and now has me wanting to do another ceromony.
Anyway heres something my brother sent me, its gonna be intersting to see how it all pans out....?

Revealed: the Saudi-Pakistan plan to counter Iran's nuclear ambitionsBy :
Editorial
06/12/2006

It is becoming clear that the first 21st century clash of civilisations – if
there is to be one – will not pit Christians against Muslims but one branch of
Islam against another. In yet another escalation of the Middle East crisis
sparked by the disastrous American-led occupation of Iraq, The Business has
learnt that, in response to Shia Iran’s ambitions to possess a nuclear arsenal,
Sunni Saudi Arabia has plans to create a nuclear capability of its own. In a
development that risks turning the Middle East into a nuclear powder keg,
Western and Middle Eastern sources have told this magazine that, if and when it
is clear that Iran has the bomb (or is close to it), the Saudis will respond by
buying one from Pakistan, a fellow Sunni state. They would also likely purchase
Pakistani ballistic missiles to replace the Chinese ones they bought in the
1980s. Everything is already in place for this to happen.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, the Saudi-Pakistan connection has been close
for some time. Western intelligence services are now convinced that Saudi Arabia
played a large role in financing Pakistan’s nuclear bomb project. Riyadh’s aim
was to guarantee it immediate access to a nuclear arsenal to counter the
emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. The Business has learnt that British
Intelligence (MI6) already regards Saudi Arabia as a surrogate nuclear power,
able to join the club whenever it chooses.

Riyadh’s long-standing links with the Pakistani bomb are only now being
scrutinised. A senior Saudi who defected to America in the 1990s warned
Washington that Riyadh was financially supporting the nuclear ambitions of
Islamabad to ensure access to nuclear weapons of its own in the future. The
Pakistani nuclear scientist and leader of the world’s biggest nuclear
proliferation ring, AQ Khan, was invited to Saudi Arabia by its Defence
Minister, who toured Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in 1999 and 2002 (the 1999
visit prompting a diplomatic complaint from Washington). A Saudi Prince was a
guest of honour at a 2002 Pakistani missile test. Pakistan was given almost
$2bn-worth of Saudi oil after the international community initiated sanctions
against Islamabad following its 1998 nuclear test.

By buying a nuclear arsenal off the shelf from Pakistan, the Saudis would
instantly acquire a deterrent without the hindrances that accompany developing
one from scratch. It would wrongfoot any countermove: the country would be in
the nuclear club before any effort to prevent it could be mounted. The Saudis
would then likely embark on fully developing their own nuclear weapons
facilities. They have already announced plans to develop a civilian nuclear
energy programme, despite being the world’s largest oil producer sitting on the
globe’s biggest reserves.

Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If it
wished to stay within the letter of its obligations Riyadh could demure from
acquiring the weapons itself and instead invite Pakistan to station nuclear
weapons in the Kingdom. But, considering the volatile nature of the situation in
the Middle East, especially following Iran’s emergence as the Gulf region’s
first nuclear power, the Saudis will likely opt for direct command and control
of any deterrent. Indeed, the current Saudi posture already marks a shift away
from the late King Fahd’s strategy of countering any Iranian bomb with an
explicit American guarantee that Saudi Arabia fell under the US nuclear
umbrella. Riyadh fears that Washington no longer provides a credible guarantee.

It is no surprise that Iran’s bid for regional hegemony, including the
leadership of Political Islam in the area, is causing extreme concern in Riyadh.
But few have forecast the extent to which it would force the Saudis to
reconsider their approach to Iraq, the United States and – most strikingly –
even Israel. The largely-Sunni Saudis have already seen Shi’ites sympathetic to
Iran coming to power in Iraq. Iranian-backed Shia militia now control much of
southern Iraq, which borders Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Riyadh is acutely aware that
it is now sharing a 500-mile border with what is rapidly becoming an Iranian
vassal. The implosion of Iraq has swept away the traditional bulwark against
Iranian expansion and regional ambitions. If Iran was to become the only Muslim
Middle Eastern member of the nuclear club, it would be the Gulf’s sole
superpower, able to assert itself throughout the region (as it is doing
already). This would be a historic humiliation for Saudi Arabia and (in Riyadh’s
view) the Sunni branch of Islam.

Animosity between the Sunnis and Shi’ites dates back to the schism of 655 AD.
The one country where the Shi’ites gained power was Iran; in the rest of the
Middle East, Sunnis ruled Shi’ites. The British Empire, which favoured
politically powerful minorities as part of its divide and rule strategy,
sanctioned this state of affairs. Until the invasion of Iraq, the Sunni minority
– roughly 20% of Iraq’s population – had all the political power. With the rise
of Shia Iran and Iranian-backed Shia power in Iraq, Sunni rulers across the
Middle East are deeply fearful about Iran’s ability to stir up their Shi’ite
minorities. Recent elections in Bahrain, where a majority Shi’ite population is
ruled by Sunni royals and government, have underlined the stirrings of anger and
resentment against the Sunni ascendancy.

Many Sunnis feel that a new Shi’ia crescent is emerging that will span Iran,
Iraq and Lebanon, a development which the Saudis wish to counter. Earlier this
summer, the Gulf monarchies were noticeably silent during the early weeks of the
conflict in the Lebanon because they wanted to give Israel time to knock out
Iran’s proxy, the Shi’ite terror group Hezbollah. It was only when it became
apparent that Israel was incapable of doing so that they joined in the
criticism.

A further sign of changing times came with a meeting between Israeli and Saudi
Arabia to discuss the Iranian threat in September. Bizarrely, this went almost
unnoticed in the West, despite its huge significance. Some Israeli strategists
now speculate that Israel, which is also desperate to prevent the Iranian regime
from getting the bomb, and Saudi Arabia, which shares the same goal, could even
form an anti-Tehran alliance. That is probably far-fetched but the fact that it
is even being discussed is a stark illustration of the extent of Saudi fear at
the thought of an Iranian nuclear hegemony.

Any Middle East intra-Islamic war of religion, if it comes, would be a horrific,
bloody and protracted affair. In Iraq, the Shi’ite- Sunni divide is already on
display at its most brutal. Sunni terrorists bomb Shi’ite Islam’s holiest
places; Shi’ite death squads torture and murder as many Sunnis as they can get
their hands on. Shia hardliners believe that the only way to break the historic
Sunni stranglehold on Iraq is with genocidal violence. Even in majority Sunni
countries, such as Pakistan, communal violence is worsening despite government
crackdowns. As Sunni-Shia ethnic cleansing grimly gathers pace in Iraq, Saudis
worry about the concentration of its Shi’ite minority in the oil-rich east of
the country (concerns heightened when Shi’ite turnout in the recent municiˇpal
elections was double that of the Sunni).

So far the Saudis have taken a low-key approach to Iraq: they are keen not to
anger their American patrons and aware of how instability could so easily flow
back over their border. Efforts have been made to stem the flow of young Saudis
heading to fight in Iraq. But, with the Saudis uncertain about America’s
willingness to stay the course, they are beginning to reconsider. In an article
in the Washington Post last week, Nawaf Obaid – a Saudi government adviser –
floated a new, more proactive Saudi policy. He stated that if America left Iraq,
there would be a “massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shi’ite
militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis.”

So far the Saudis have taken a low-key approach to Iraq: they are keen not to
anger their American patrons and aware of how instability could so easily flow
back over their border. Efforts have been made to stem the flow of young Saudis
heading to fight in Iraq. But, with the Saudis uncertain about America’s
willingness to stay the course, they are beginning to reconsider. In an article
in the Washington Post last week, Nawaf Obaid – a Saudi government adviser –
floated a new, more proactive Saudi policy. He stated that if America left Iraq,
there would be a “massive Saudi intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shi’ite
militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis.”

The piece was timed to coincide with a proposal from the US State Department for
a so-called 80% solution in Iraq that would involve effectively ignoring the
Sunni population and instead working exclusively with the Shi’ite and Kurdish
leadership. Such an approach would mean, in practice, Sunnis being forced out of
mixed areas in Iraq and denied a share of Iraq’s oil revenues. Through Obaid,
the Saudis were making clear publicly that they would not accept such a plan,
especially since it would undermine the existing regime in Riyadh. The Saudi
Royals are well aware that if they are seen to be ineffective in protecting
their fellow Sunnis in Iraq, another bin Laden-like figure could emerge as the
leader of a mujahideen to protect Iraq’s Sunnis, challenging the legitimacy of
the House of Saud.

As the Saudis look to Pakistan for nuclear insurance against Iran, so they are
also contemplating deploying the oil weapon against their regional rival. Obaid
claimed that Saudi Arabia could afford to cut the price of oil in half, a move
that would bankrupt Iran. In 2005 the Saudis initiated a $50bn scheme designed
to increase their oil production by 1.5m barrels per day and give Riyadh more
leverage over prices. Iran has nothing like the same clout: its oil industry has
weakened considerably. Iran is currently producing 5% less than its OPEC quota
because of technical difficulties; the oil minister has warned that without
substantial investment, production will collapse by 13% a year. Yet, because of
the difficulties of attracting foreign investment and expertise to Iran, it is
hard to see where the money would come from, especially since Tehran has little
cash in its own coffers.

All this accentuates the strategic logic of Saudi Arabia purchasing the bomb. At
a stroke, the Saudis would have undercut the nationalist and religious appeal of
Iran’s bomb. They would also be challenging Tehran to an arms race in which it
could not afford to compete. But a Middle East with a nuclear Iran and Saudi
Arabia vying for supremacy would be an intolerably dangerous and unstable place,
especially when the Israeli dimension is added. The old cold-war nuclear
certainties of deterrence and mutually-assured destruction are less than
reassuring in a region where ancient hatreds and religious fervour are so
strong. Iran’s President Ahmadinejad, let us note, prayed openly for the
apocalypse at the UN General Assembly.

Iraq could easily turn into the battlefield for a proxy war between Iran and
Saudi Arabia, with disastrous consequences for global oil supplies and the world
economy. Such a conflict would involve countries that produce 13.4m barrels of
oil a day – 20% of world oil production – and have 43% of the world’s proven oil
reserves. The result would be a price of oil far above $100 a barrel and a deep
economic shock for the rest of the world, triggering chaos and crisis from China
to Chile.

The Bush Administration’s post-Iraq legacy is clear to see and it is a grim one:
a Middle East in which countries are no longer prepared to rely on American
guarantees of protection, where Iran is emerging as the regional superpower and
where the ancient Sunni-Shi’ite divide is becoming the defining issue, with both
sides set to arm themselves with weapons of mass destruction. If Iran is
prevented from going nuclear, catastrophe might be avoided. But after the
debacle in Iraq, it is hard to see who will stop Iran. It is difficult to blame
Riyadh for seeking its own insurance policy.